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      Inevitability and War 
      By Joseph S. Nye, Jr 
 
  World War I killed some 20 million people. In one battle, the Somme, 
1.3 million were killed and wounded, compared to only 36,000 casualties 
when Germany defeated Austria a half century earlier. World War I was a 
horrifying war of trenches, barbed wire, machine guns, and artillery that 
ground up a generation of Europe’s youth. It not only destroyed people, it 
destroyed three European empires: the German, Austro-Hungarian, and 
Russian. Until World War I, the global balance of power was centered in 
Europe. After World War I, Europe still mattered, but the United States and 
Japan emerged as great powers.  World War I also ushered in the Russian 
Revolution in 1917, prepared the way for fascism and accelerated the 
ideological battles that wracked the 20
th century. 
  How could such a catastrophic event happen?  Bernhard von Bülow, 
the German chancellor from 1900 to 1909, met with his successor, Theobald 
von Bethmann Hollweg, in the chancellor’s palace in Berlin shortly after the 
war broke out.  “I said to him, ‘Well, tell me, at least, how it all happened.’ 
He raised his long, thin arms to heaven and answered in a dull, exhausted 
voice: ‘Oh, if I only knew!’ In many later polemics on war guilt I have often 
wished it had been possible to produce a snapshot of Bethmann Hollweg 
standing there at the moment he said those words. Such a photograph would 
have been the best proof that this wretched man had never wanted war.”
1  
Perhaps in self-exoneration, Bethmann came to regard the war as inevitable. 
The British Foreign Minister, Sir Edward Grey agreed. In April 1918, he   2 
said he had “come to think that no human individual could have prevented 
it.” 
2 
  Are there lessons for today? Martin Wolf writes that “history, alas, 
also teaches us that friction between status quo and revisionist powers may 
well lead to conflict, however ruinous the consequences. Indeed, Thucydides 
the great ancient historian, argued that the calamitous Peloponnesian war 
was due to the alarm that the growing power of Athens inspired in Sparta.”
3 
Margaret MacMillan adds that “it is tempting – and sobering -- to compare 
today’s relationship between China and America to that between Germany 
and Britain a century ago.”
4 After drawing a similar comparison, The 
Economist concluded that “the most troubling similarity between 1914 and 
now is complacency.”
5 And some political scientists like John Mearsheimer 
have stated that “to put it bluntly, China cannot rise peacefully.” 
6 
  Citing Thucydides in regard to the rise of China is not new. I plead 
guilty to having published such a comparison fifteen years ago.
7 But as 
Richard Neustadt and Ernest May have warned, historical metaphors and 
analogies can be misleading when differences in context are not made 
explicit.
8 To some extent, World War I was caused by the rise in the power 
of Germany and the fear that created in Great Britain, but it was also caused 
by the rise in the power of Russia and the fear that created in Germany, the 
rise of Slavic nationalism and the fear that created in Austria-Hungary, as 
well as myriad other factors that differed from ancient Greece. And there is 
greater difference in the overall power of the US and China today than there 
was between Germany and Britain in the last century. Metaphors can be 
useful as general precautions, but they become dangerous when they convey 
a sense of historical inevitability.  There are structural similarities about the 
three situations – ancient Greece, World War I, and US-China relations – but   3 
also important differences in context that allow opportunities for human 
agency to matter. In fact, even in the paradigm case of the Peloponnesian 
War, there was more room for human agency than some of today’s 
commentators realize.  Citing Thucydides can become a trap. 
 
      Misreading the Peloponnesian War 
 
 In the middle of the 5
th century BCE, Athens and Sparta had a truce 
which  Corcyra  finally  convinced  Athens  to  break  it  with  the  following 
argument: “There are three considerable naval powers in Hellas: Athens, 
Corcyra, and Corinth. If Corinth gets control of us first, and you allow our 
navy to be united with hers, you will have to fight against the combined 
fleets  of  Corcyra  and  the  Peloponnese.  But  if  you  receive  us  into  your 
alliance, you will enter upon the war with our ships as well as your own.”
9 
The Athenians decided to break the treaty, because, in Thucydides’ words, 
“the general belief was that whatever happened, war with the Peloponnese 
was bound to come.”
10 Ironically, the belief that war was inevitable played a 
major role in causing it. Athens felt that if the war was going to come, it was 
better  to  have  two-to-one  naval  superiority  rather  than  one-to-two  naval 
inferiority.  
Cooperation is difficult to develop when playing a Prisoners’ Dilemma 
game  once,  or  when  one  thinks  the  last  move  in  an  iterative  game  is 
approaching.  Game  theorists  like  Robert  Axelrod  have  shown  that  after 
many  games,  on  average  the  best  results  were  obtained  by  learning  to 
cooperate. But Axelrod warns that cooperation in tit for tat reciprocity is an 
optimal strategy only when one has a chance to continue the game for a long 
period, when there is a “long shadow of the future.”
11  That is why the belief   4 
that  war  is  inevitable  is  so  corrosive  in  international  politics. When  you 
believe war is inevitable, you are very close to the last move. If you suspect 
your opponent will cheat, it is better to take the risk of defecting rather than 
cooperating. That is what Athens did, and one sees a similar dynamic as 
European states debated whether to delay mobilization in July 1914.  
But  the  classical  Greek  case  is  not  as  straightforward  as  Thucydides 
asserts. Thucydides concluded that the cause of the war was the growth of 
the power of Athens and the fear it caused in Sparta. But Donald Kagan has 
shown that Athenian power was in fact not growing. Before the war broke 
out in 431 B.C. the balance of power had begun to stabilize. And though the 
Spartans worried about the rise of Athenian power, he contends they had an 
even greater fear of a slave revolt.  
Thus  the  immediate  or  precipitating  causes  of  the  war  were  more 
important  than  Thucydides’s  theory  of  inevitability  admits.  Corinth,  for 
example,  thought  Athens  would  not  fight;  it  misjudged  the  Athenian 
response, partly because it was so angry at Corcyra. Pericles overreacted; he 
made mistakes in giving an ultimatum to Potidaea and in punishing Megara 
by cutting off its trade. Those policy mistakes made the Spartans think that 
war might be worth the risk after all. Kagan argues that Athenian growth 
caused the first Peloponnesian War earlier in the century, but that the Thirty-
Year Truce doused that flame. So to start the second Peloponnesian War, 
“the spark of the Epidamnian trouble needed to land on one of the rare bits 
of  flammable  stuff  that  had  not  been  thoroughly  drenched.  Thereafter  it 
needed to be continually and vigorously fanned by the Corinthians, soon 
assisted  by  the  Megarians,  Potidaeans,  Aeginetans,  and  the  Spartan  War 
Party.  Even  then  the  spark  might  have  been  extinguished  had  not  the 
Athenians provided some additional fuel at the crucial moment.”
12 In other   5 
words, the war was not caused by impersonal forces but by bad decisions in 
difficult circumstances. 
While there are no absolute answers in debates over structure and agency 
in  human  events,  very  little  is  ever  truly  inevitable  in  history.  Human 
behavior  is  voluntary,  although  there  are  always  external  constraints.  As 
Marx famously observed, men make history, but not in conditions of their 
own choosing. The ancient Greeks made flawed choices when they were 
caught  in  the  situation  well  described  by  Thucydides  and  by  Prisoner’s 
Dilemma  games.  The  security  dilemma  made  war  highly  probable,  but 
highly probable is not the same as inevitable. The 30-year unlimited war that 
devastated Athens was not inevitable. Human decisions mattered.  
 
 
    The Multiple Causes of  World War I 
 
  Generations of historians have examined the origins of World War I.  It is 
impossible to isolate one cause, though Woody Allen tried in his movie 
“Zelig:”  “Britain ruled the world and Germany wanted it.”  More seriously, 
parts of the answer lie at each of the three levels of analysis.13  
At the level of the international system  structure, there were two key 
elements: the rise of German power and the increased rigidity in the alliance 
systems. The rise of German power was truly impressive. German heavy 
industry surpassed that of Great Britain in the 1890s. By 1914, Britain’s 
share of the world’s industrial production had shrunk to 10 percent, and 
Germany’s share had risen to 15 percent. Germany transformed some of its 
industrial  strength  into  military  capability,  including  a  massive  naval   6 
armaments program. 
14 A strategic aim of Germany’s “Tirpitz Plan” was to 
build the second largest navy in the world, thereby advancing itself as a 
world power. This expansion alarmed Britain which began to feel isolated 
and worried about how it would defend its far-flung empire. In 1907, Sir 
Eyre Crowe of the British Foreign Office wrote his famous memorandum in 
which  he  concluded  that  although  German  policy  might  be  vague  and 
confused, Britain could not allow one country to dominate the continent of 
Europe. Crowe argued that the British response was nearly a law of nature. 
Britain’s response to Germany’s rising power contributed to the second 
structural cause of the war: the increasing rigidity in the alliance systems in 
Europe. In 1904, parting from its geographically semi-isolated position as a 
balancer off the coast of Europe, Britain  moved toward an alliance with 
France,  and  in  1907,  the  Anglo-French  partnership  broadened  to  include 
Russia. Germany, seeing itself encircled, tightened its relations with Austria-
Hungary. As the alliances became more rigid, diplomatic flexibility was lost. 
The  balance  of  power  no  longer  featured  shifting  alignments  that 
characterized Bismarck’s era. Instead, the major powers wrapped themselves 
around  two  poles  that  accentuated  the  security  dilemma  that  defensive 
realists  emphasize.  As  Clark  observes,  “the  bifurcation  into  two  alliance 
blocs did not cause the war….yet without the two blocs, the war could not 
have broken out in the way it did.” 
15 
There were also changes that altered the process of the system that had 
once been called the “concert of Europe.”  One was the continuing rise of 
nationalism. In Eastern Europe , Pan-Slavism threatened both the Ottoman 
and Austro-Hungarian empires, which each had large Slavic populations.  
German authors wrote about the inevitability of the Teutonic-Slavic battles 
and  schoolbooks  inflamed  nationalist  passions. Nationalism  proved  to  be   7 
stronger than socialism when it came to bonding working classes together, 
and  stronger  than  the  capitalism  that  bound  bankers  together.  Indeed,  it 
proved  stronger  than  family  ties  among  the  monarchs.  The  Kaiser  once 
hoped that because war was impending over the assassination of a fellow 
royal,  the  Czar  would  see  things  the  same  way  he  did.  But  by  then 
nationalism  had  overcome  any  sense  of  aristocratic  or  monarchical 
solidarity. 
A second cause for the loss of moderation in the early twentieth-century 
balance of power process was a rise in complacency about peace. The great 
powers had not been involved in a war in Europe for 40 years. There had 
been  crises—in  Morocco  in  1905–1906,  in  Bosnia  in  1908,  in  Morocco 
again  in  1911,  and  the  Balkan  wars  in  1912—but  they  had  all  been 
manageable.  However,  the  diplomatic  compromises  that  resolved  these 
conflicts caused frustration. Afterward, there was a tendency to ask,  “Why 
didn’t  we  make  the  other  side  give  up  more?”  Additionally,  there  was 
growing acceptance of social Darwinism. If the strong should prevail, why 
worry about peace? Long wars seemed unlikely, and many leaders believed 
short decisive wars won by the strong would be a welcome change. 
A third factor contributing to the loss of flexibility in the early twentieth-
century balance of power process was German policy. As Eyre Crowe said, 
it  was  vague  and  confusing.  There  was  a  terrible  clumsiness  about  the 
Kaiser’s policy of seeking greater power. The Germans were no different 
from other colonial powers in having “world ambitions,” but they managed 
to  press them  forward in  a  way  that antagonized  everybody  at the  same 
time—just the opposite of the way Bismarck played the system in the 1870s 
and 1880s. The Germans antagonized the British by starting a naval arms 
race. They antagonized the Russians over issues in Turkey and the Balkans.   8 
They antagonized the French over a protectorate in Morocco.  
The second level of analysis examines what was happening in domestic 
society, politics, and government prior to World War I. We can safely reject 
Lenin’s  argument  that  the  war  was  simply  the  final  stage  of  capitalist 
imperialism.  It  did  not  arise  out  of  imperialist  conflicts  on  the  colonial 
peripheries as Lenin had expected. In 1898, Britain and France confronted 
each  other  at  Fashoda,  and  if  war  had  occurred  then,  it  might  have  fit 
Lenin’s explanation. But the war broke out sixteen years later in Europe, and 
even then bankers and businessmen strongly resisted it. Sir Edward Grey felt 
that Britain had to prevent Germany from gaining mastery of the European 
balance of power. But Grey also worried about getting the London bankers 
to go along with declaring war, and his Liberal party was split on the issue.  
Two other domestic causes need to be taken more seriously: the internal 
crises  of  the  declining  Austro-Hungarian  and  Ottoman  empires,  and  the 
domestic political situation in Germany. Both Austria-Hungary and Ottoman 
Turkey were multinational empires threatened by the rise of nationalism. In 
addition, the Ottoman government was very weak, very corrupt, and an easy 
target for nationalist groups in the Balkans that wanted to free themselves 
from centuries of Turkish rule. The Balkan wars of 1912 pushed the Turks 
out, but in the next year the Balkan states fell to war among themselves 
while  dividing  the  spoils.  These  conflicts  whetted  the  appetite  of  some 
Balkan states to fight Austria; if the Turks could be pushed out, then why not 
the Austrians too? 
Serbia  took  the  lead  among  the  Balkan  states.  Austrian  elites  feared 
disintegration and worried about the widespread predictions of decline. In 
the end, Austria went to war against Serbia not because a Serb assassinated 
its Archduke, but because Austria wanted to weaken Serbia and prevent it   9 
from becoming a magnet for nationalism among the Balkan Slavs. General 
Conrad von Hötzendorf, the Austrian chief of staff, stated his motives very 
clearly: “For this reason, and not as vengeance for the assassination, Austria-
Hungary  must draw the sword against Serbia. ...The monarchy had been 
seized  by  the  throat  and  had  to  choose  between  allowing  itself  to  be 
strangled,  and  making  a  last  effort  to  prevent  its  destruction.”
16 
Disintegration of an empire because of nationalism was the more profound 
cause of the war; not the slain Franz Ferdinand. 
Another important domestic-level explanation of World War I lay in the 
domestic  politics  of  Germany.  Many  historians  now  believe  that  Fritz 
Fischer and his followers overstated Germany’s social problems as a key 
cause.  For  example,  Russia’s  internal  divisions  also  deserve  attention. 
According to Fischer, Germany’s efforts toward world hegemony were an 
attempt  by  German  elites  to  distract  attention  from  the  poor  domestic 
integration of an industrializing German society. He notes that Germany was 
ruled  by  a  domestic  coalition  of  landed  aristocrats  and  some  very  large 
industrial capitalists, the Coalition of Rye and Iron. This ruling coalition 
used expansionist policies to provide foreign adventures instead of domestic 
reform—circuses  in  place  of  bread.  They  viewed  expansionism  as  an 
alternative to social democracy. Internal economic and social tensions  in 
Germany are not sufficient to explain World War I, but they do help explain 
one source of the pressure that Germany put on the international system after 
1890. 
A final domestic-level explanation appeals to the crisis instability of the 
situation in the summer of 1914. Military leaders in all countries shared a 
“cult of the offensive” favoring rapid mobilization and deployment, dramatic 
strategies  involving  sudden  flanking  movements  of  armies  or  dramatic   10 
breakthrough  assaults,  and  freewheeling  tactics  of  maneuver.  In  fact,  as 
military  planners  discovered  the  hard  way,  the  prevailing  military 
technology  of  the  day  did  not  favor  the  offense,  but  European  leaders 
believed that it did. Once the July crisis hit, leaders felt enormous pressure to 
get in the first blow. Of course, this particular explanation does not help us 
understand  why  Europe  sat  on  a  powder  keg.  It  does,  however,  help  us 
understand why the spark in the Balkans traveled so quickly along the fuse. 
What  about  the  first  level  of  analysis,  the  role  of  individuals?  What 
distinguished the leadership on the eve of World War I was its mediocrity. 
The Austro-Hungarian emperor, Franz Joseph (1830–1916), was a tired old 
man who was putty in the hands of General Conrad and Count Leopold von 
Berchtold. Ironically, the assassinated Franz Ferdinand, would have been a 
restraining force. In Russia, Czar Nicholas II was an isolated autocrat who 
spent  most  of  his  time  resisting  change  at  home.  He  was  served  by 
incompetent foreign and defense ministers. As MacMillan has put it, “it was 
Russia’s misfortune, and the world’s, that its leadership was so inadequate as 
it was about to head into a major international storm.”
17  In Germany, Kaiser 
Wilhelm II had a great sense of inferiority. He was a blusterer, a weak man 
who was extremely emotional. While he did not control policy, his position 
at the apex of the system gave him influence which encouraged Germany 
into  a  risky  policy  without  skill  or  consistency.  Personality  did  make  a 
difference. There was something about the leaders, the Kaiser in particular, 
that made them significant contributory causes of the war.  
Was War Inevitable? 
If World War I was over-determined, does that mean it was inevitable? 
The  answer  is  no;  war  was  not  inevitable  until  it  actually  broke  out  in   11 
August 1914. And even then it was not inevitable that four years of carnage 
had to follow. 
Let us distinguish three types of causes in terms of their proximity in 
time to an event. The most remote are deep causes, then come intermediate 
causes, and those immediately before the event are precipitating causes. An 
analogy is building a fire: The logs are the deep cause, the kindling and 
paper are the intermediate cause, and the actual striking of the match is the 
precipitating cause. 
In World War I, the deep causes were changes in the structure of the 
balance  of  power  and  certain  aspects  of  the  domestic  political  systems. 
Especially  important  reasons  were  the  rise  of  German  strength,  the 
development of a bipolar alliance system, the rise of nationalism and the 
resultant destruction  of  two  declining  empires, and  German  politics. The 
intermediate  causes  were  German  policy,  the  rise  in  complacency  about 
peace, and the personal idiosyncrasies of the leaders. The precipitating cause 
was the assassination of Franz Ferdinand at Sarajevo by a Serbian terrorist 
and Austria-Hungary’s subsequent ultimatum to Serbia. 
Looking back, things always look inevitable. Indeed, some structuralists 
might say that if the assassination had not occurred, some other precipitating 
incident would have caused the war, because precipitating events are like 
buses—they  come  along  every  ten  minutes.  Thus  the  specific  event  at 
Sarajevo  was  not  all  that  important;  some  incident  would  probably  have 
occurred sooner or later.  
This type of argument can be tested by counterfactual history. What if 
there  had  been  no  assassination  in  Sarajevo?  The  deep  and  intermediate 
causes suggested a high probability of war, but a high probability is not the 
same as inevitability. Using the metaphor of the fire again, logs and kindling   12 
may sit for a long time and never be lit. Indeed, if it rains before somebody 
comes along with a match, they may not catch fire even when a Sarajevo 
occurs. 
Suppose there had been no assassination in Sarajevo in 1914, and no 
crisis occurred until 1916; what might have happened? One possibility is 
that  the  growth  in  Russian  strength  might  have  deterred  Germany  from 
recklessly  backing  Austria.  In  1914,  General  Helmuth  von  Moltke  and 
Foreign Secretary Gottlieb von Jagow, two of the German leaders who were  
influential  in  precipitating  the  war,  believed  that  war  with  Russia  was 
inevitable. They knew Germany would have a problem fighting a war on 
two fronts and would have to knock out one side before fighting the other. 
Russia, although larger, had a poor transportation system, so it could be put 
off for the second strike. After victory over France, Germany could turn east 
and take its time to defeat the Russians. That was the Schlieffen Plan.  
But this strategy might have become obsolete by 1916 because Russia 
was using French money to build railroads. In the 1890s it would have taken 
the Russians two or three months before they could have transported all their 
troops to the German front, giving Germany ample time to fight France first. 
By 1910, that time had shrunk to eighteen days, and the German planners 
knew they no longer had a large margin of safety. By 1916, the margin 
would have been gone and Germany might have had to drop its two-front 
strategy. Consequently, some German leaders thought that a war in 1914 
was better than a war later.  
If no assassination and crisis had occurred in 1914, and the world had 
made it to 1916 without a war, it is possible the Germans might have felt 
deterred, unable to risk a two-front war. They might have been more careful 
before giving Austria a blank check as they did in 1914. Or they might have   13 
dropped the Schlieffen Plan and concentrated on a war in the east only. Or 
they might have come to terms with Great Britain or changed their view that 
the offense had the advantage in warfare. Britain was already having some 
second thoughts about its alliance with Russia because of Russian actions in 
Persia  and  Afghanistan.  In  summary,  in  another  two  years,  a  variety  of 
changes related to Russian strength might have prevented the war. Without 
war, German industrial strength would have continued to grow and Germany 
might  have  become  so  strong  that  France  and  Britain  would  have  been 
deterred. 
We can also raise counterfactuals about what might have happened in 
Britain’s  internal  affairs  if two  more  years had passed  without  war.  The 
Liberal  Party  was  committed  to  withdrawing  British  troops  from  Ireland 
while  the  Conservatives,  particularly  in  Northern  Ireland,  were  bitterly 
opposed. There was a prospect of mutiny in the British army. If the Ulster 
Revolt had developed further, it is quite plausible that Britain would have 
been so internally preoccupied that it would not have been able to join the 
coalition  with  France  and  Russia.  Certainly  many  historically  significant 
changes could have occurred in two more years of peace.  In terms of the 
fire metaphor, there was a high probability of rain.  
What Kind of War? 
  Another set of counterfactuals raises questions about what kind of war 
would have occurred rather than whether a war would have occurred. It is 
true that Germany’s policies frightened its neighbors and that Germany in 
turn was afraid of being encircled by the Triple Entente, so it is reasonable to 
argue that war was more likely than not. But what kind of war? The war did 
not have to be what we now remember as World War I. Counterfactually,   14 
four other wars were possible. 
One was a simple local war – “the third Balkan War”. Initially, German 
leaders  expected  a  replay  of  the  Bosnian  crisis  of  1908–1909  when  the 
Germans  backed  the  Austrians,  and  Austria  was  therefore  able  to  make 
Russia  stand  down  in  the  Balkans.  On  July  5,  1914,  when  the  Kaiser 
promised full support to Austria-Hungary, the expectation was for a local 
war. The Kaiser and officials continued their vacation plans so as to avoid 
alarming  the  other  Powers.  Contrary  to  some  assertions,  they  were  not 
planning a preventive war. 
18 When they realized their miscalculation , the 
Kaiser made efforts to keep the war from escalating; hence the  famous last 
minute Willie-Nicky telegrams between the Kaiser and  the Czar. If such 
efforts had been successful, we might today recall not World War I, but 
merely a relatively minor Austro-Serbian War of August 1914. 
  A second counterfactual possibility was a one-front war. When the 
Russians mobilized their troops, the Germans also mobilized. The Kaiser 
asked General von Moltke whether he could limit the preparations to just the 
eastern front. Moltke replied that it was impossible because any change in  
the  timetables  for  assembling  the  troops  and  supplies  would  create  a 
logistical nightmare. He told the Kaiser that if he tried to change the plans, 
he would have a disorganized mass instead of an army. However, there were 
more possibilities, and had the Germans acted earlier to reassure the French, 
or had the Kaiser insisted, there might have been a one-front war.
19 
  A third counterfactual is to imagine a two -front war without Britain: 
Germany and Austria versus France and Russia . If the British Expeditionary 
Force had not been there to make the difference, Germany might well have 
won. It is possible that Britain might not have joined if Germany had not 
invaded Belgium, although Belgium was not the main cause of Britain   15 
entering the war. For some people, like Sir Edward Grey and the Foreign 
Office,  the  main  reason  for  entering the  war  was  the  danger  of  German 
control of the Continent. But Britain was a democracy, and the Cabinet was 
split.  The  left  Liberals  opposed  war,  but  when  Germany  swept  through 
Belgium and violated Belgian neutrality, it allowed the pro-war Liberals to 
overcome the reluctance of the antiwar Liberals and to repair the split in the 
British government. 
Finally,  a  fourth  counterfactual  is  a  war  without  the  United  States. 
Shaking his fist at an American visitor during his post war exile, the Kaiser 
complained that “you are responsible for my being here.”
20 By early 1918, 
Germany might have won the war if the United States had not tipped the 
military balance by its entry in 1917. In 1916 Woodrow Wilson won  re-
election on a platform of staying out of war. One of the reasons the United 
States became involved was the weakening of Bethmann-Hollweg and the 
decision of the German military to recommence an unrestricted  submarine 
campaign  against  Allied  and  American  shipping.  There  was  also  some 
German  diplomatic  clumsiness  when  Germany  sent  the  Zimmermann 
telegram  instructing  its  embassy  in  Mexico  to  approach  the  Mexican 
government regarding an alliance against the United States – a message that 
Britain  decoded  and  passed  to  the  U.S.  Washington  regarded  these 
intercepted instructions as a hostile act. These factors led the United States 
to enter the war, but even then, it is worth noting that one of the options 
Wilson considered was “armed neutrality.”
21 
Our counterfactual analysis first suggests ways in which the war might 
not have occurred in 1914, and second, ways in which the war that occurred 
did not have to become four years of carnage, which destroyed Europe as the 
heart  of  the  global  balance  of  power.  It  suggests  that  World  War  I  was   16 
probable, but not inevitable. Human choices mattered. 
The Funnel of Choices 
  History  is  path  dependent.  Events  close  in  over  time,  degrees  of 
freedom are lost, and the probability of war increases. But the funnel of 
choices available to leaders might open up again, and degrees of freedom 
could be regained  If we start in 1898 and ask what was the most likely war 
in Europe, the answer would have been war between France and Britain, 
which were eyeball to eyeball in a colonial dispute in Africa. But after the 
British and French formed the Entente in 1904, a Franco-British war looked 
less likely. The first Moroccan crisis in 1905 and the Bosnian crisis in 1908 
made  war  with  Germany  look  more  likely.  But  some  interesting  events 
occurred in 1910. Bethmann Hollweg sought détente with Britain. Britain 
implied that it would remain neutral in any European war if Germany would 
limit its navy. At that same time, it looked as if renewed colonial friction 
between Britain and Russia in Asia threatened a collapse or erosion of the 
Triple Entente. In other words, in 1910 the funnel of choices started to widen 
again. 
But  the  funnel  closed  once  more  in  1911  with  the  second  Moroccan 
crisis. When France sent troops to help the Sultan of Morocco, Germany 
demanded compensation in the French Congo and sent a gunboat to Agadir 
on  the  coast  of  Morocco.  Britain  prepared  its  fleet.  French  and  German 
bankers lobbied against war, and the Kaiser pulled back. But these events 
deeply affected public opinion and raised fears about German intentions. 
Although the Balkan wars in 1912 and 1913 and the increased pressure 
on Austria set the scene for 1914, there was also a renewed effort at détente 
in 1912. Britain sent Lord Haldane, a prominent Liberal politician, to Berlin,   17 
and the British and Germans resolved a number of the issues. Also, by this 
time  it  was  clear that  Britain had  won the naval  arms  race.  Perhaps  the 
funnel would open up again. 
In  June  1914,  the  feeling  that  relations  were  improving  was  strong 
enough for Britain to send four of its Dreadnought battleships to Kiel for a 
state visit. If Britain had thought war was about to occur, the last thing it 
would have done was put four of its prime battleships in an enemy harbor. 
Clearly, the British were not thinking about war at that point. In fact, on June 
28, British and German sailors were walking together along the quay in Kiel 
when  they  heard  the  news  that  a  Serbian  terrorist  had  shot  an  Austrian 
archduke in a faraway place called Sarajevo. History has its surprises, and 
once again, probable is not the same as inevitable. 
      Contemporary Lessons?  
  Accidents  and  personalities  and  choices  make  a  difference  even  if 
they work within limits set by the larger structure, the situation of insecurity 
that  resembles  the  Prisoner’s  Dilemma.  That  was  true  of  both  the 
Peloponnesian  War  and  of  World  War  I.  As  Christopher  Clark  has 
summarized, once catastrophes occur, “they impose on us (or seem to do so) 
a  sense  of  their  necessity.  This  is  a  process  that  unfolds  at  many 
levels….The quest for the causes of the war, which for nearly a century has 
dominated the literature on this conflict, reinforces that tendency: causes 
trawled from the length and breadth of Europe’s pre-war decades are piled 
like  weights  on  the  scale  until  it  tilts  from  probability  to  inevitability. 
Contingency, choice and agency are squeezed out of the field of vision.” But 
Clark concludes that in 1914, “the future was still open – just. For all the 
hardening of the fronts in both of Europe’s armed camps, there were signs   18 
that the moment for a major confrontation might be passing.”
22  
Can  we  draw  contemporary  lessons  from  this  history?  We  must  be 
careful because analogies can mislead, and many myths have been created 
about World War I.  For example, some say World War I was a deliberate 
preventive war by Germany. While some Germans like von Moltke held that 
view, the evidence shows that key elites did not.   Others portray World War 
I as an accidental war, but it was not purely accidental. Austria went to war 
deliberately. And if there was to be a war, some in Germany preferred a war 
in 1914 to a war later. There were miscalculations over the length and depth 
of the war, but that is not the same as an accidental war. It is also said that 
the war was caused by an uncontrolled arms race in Europe. But by 1912, 
the naval arms race was over, and Britain had won. While there was concern 
in Europe about the growing strength of the armies, the view that the war 
was precipitated directly by the arms race is too simple. 
On the other hand, we can draw some valid warnings from the long slide 
into World War I. One lesson is to pay attention to the process of a balance-
of-power  system  as  well  as  to  its  structure  or  distribution  of  power. 
Moderation  evolves  from  the  process.  Stability  is  not  assured  by  the 
distribution  of  power  alone.  Another  useful  lesson  is  to  beware  of 
complacency about peace or believing that the next crisis is going to fit the 
same pattern as the last crisis: The July Crisis of 1914 was supposed to be a 
repeat of the Bosnian crisis of 1908, though clearly it was not. World War I 
was supposed to be a repeat of the Franco-Prussian War. In addition, the 
experience of World War I suggests it is important to have military forces 
that are stable in crisis, without any feeling that one must use them or lose 
them. The railway timetables were not the major determinants of World War 
I, but they did make it more difficult for political leaders to buy time for   19 
diplomacy. 
Today’s world is different from the world of 1914 in several important 
ways:  One  is  that  nuclear  weapons  have  given  political  leaders  the 
equivalent of a crystal ball that shows what their world would look like after 
escalation. Perhaps if the Emperor, the Kaiser and the Czar had had a crystal 
ball showing their empires destroyed and their thrones lost in 1918, they 
would have been more prudent in 1914.  Certainly, the crystal ball effect had 
a strong influence on American and Soviet leaders during the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, and it would likely have a similar influence on American and Chinese 
leaders today.  
 Another  change  in  context,  as  John  Mueller  has  noted,  is  that  the 
ideology of war is much weaker in many major societies.
23 In 1914, war was 
thought  to  be  inevitable,  a  fatalistic  view  compounded  by  the  social 
Darwinist argument that war should be welcome because it would clear the 
air like a good summer storm.  While Winston Churchill was not typical of 
all his compatriots and there are  some myths about the degree of eagerness 
for war in August 1914, Churchill’s The World Crisis describes this feeling: 
“There was a strange temper in the air. Unsatisfied by material prosperity, 
the  nations  turned  fiercely  toward  strife,  internal  or  external.  National 
passions,  unduly  exalted  in  the  decline  of  religion,  burned  beneath  the 
surface of nearly every land with fierce, if shrouded, fires. Almost one might 
think the world wished to suffer. Certainly men were everywhere eager to 
dare.”  MacMillan  argues  that  “they  accepted  the  coming  of  war  with 
resignation and a sense of obligation, persuaded that their nations were the 
innocent parties …and the soldiers did indeed tell their families that they 
would be home for Christmas.”
24 
While  nationalism  is  growing  in  China  today,  and  the  United  States   20 
entered  two  wars  after  the  9/11  attacks,  it  is  inaccurate  to  describe  the 
prevailing  climate  in  either  country  as  bellicose  or  complacent  about  a 
limited war. China aspires to play a larger role in its region and the US has 
allies to whose defense it is committed. Miscalculations are always possible, 
but they can be managed by the right policy choices. The legitimacy of the 
Chinese government depends on a high rate of economic growth and the top 
leaders realize that China will need many decades before it approaches the 
sophistication of the American economy. Where Germany was pressing hard 
on  Britain’s  heels  (and  passed  it  in  industrial  strength),  the  US  remains 
decades  ahead  of  China  in  overall  military,  economic,  and  soft  power 
resources.
25 Moreover, China cannot afford a policy like that of the Kaiser’s 
Germany. Too adventuresome a policy risks its gains at home and abroad. 
Finally, China and the US face a number of issues like energy, climate and 
financial stability where they have strong incentives to cooperate. 
In other words, the United States has more time to manage it relations 
with a rising power than Britain did a century ago, and China has incentives 
for restraint. Too much fear can be self-fulfilling. Whether the United States 
and China will manage their relationship well is another question. Human 
error and miscalculation are always possible. But that will be a matter of 
human agency and choice. Among the lessons we should take away from 
this  history  of  a  century  ago,  is  to  beware  of  Greeks,  Europeans,    (or 
analysts)  bearing  analogical  gifts,  particularly  if  they  have  a  whiff  of 
inevitability.   
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